Formalization of the Advanced Encryption Standard. Part I

Kenichi Arai
Tokyo University of Science
Chiba, Japan

Hiroyuki Okazaki
Shinshu University
Nagano, Japan

Summary. In this article, we formalize the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES, which is the most widely used symmetric cryptosystem in the world, is a block cipher that was selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as an official Federal Information Processing Standard for the United States in 2001 [12]. AES is the successor to DES [13], which was formerly the most widely used symmetric cryptosystem in the world. We formalize the AES algorithm according to [12]. We then verify the correctness of the formalized algorithm that the ciphertext encoded by the AES algorithm can be decoded uniquely by the same key. Please note the following points about this formalization: the AES round process is composed of the SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey transformations (see [12]). In this formalization, the SubBytes and MixColumns transformations are given as permutations, because it is necessary to treat the finite field GF(2^8) for those transformations. The formalization of AES that considers the finite field GF(2^8) is formalized by the future article.

MSC: 68P25, 94A60, 03B35

Keywords: Mizar formalization; Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm; cryptology

MML identifier: AESCIP_1, version: 8.1.02 5.19.1189

The notation and terminology used in this paper have been introduced in the following articles: [5], [1], [13], [4], [6], [16], [14], [11], [7], [8], [15], [18], [2], [3], [9], [19], [17], and [10].

1This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI 21240001 and 22300285.
2This research was presented during the 2012 International Conference on Foundations of Computer Science FCS’12 in Las Vegas, USA.
1. Preliminaries

Let us consider natural numbers $k$, $m$. Now we state the propositions:

(1) If $m \neq 0$ and $(k+1) \mod m \neq 0$, then $(k+1) \mod m = (k \mod m) + 1$.
(2) If $m \neq 0$ and $(k+1) \mod m \neq 0$, then $(k+1) \div m = k \div m$.
(3) If $m \neq 0$ and $(k+1) \mod m = 0$, then $m - 1 = k \mod m$.
(4) If $m \neq 0$ and $(k+1) \mod m = 0$, then $(k+1) \div m = (k \div m) + 1$.
(5) $(k-m) \mod m = k \mod m$.
(6) If $m \neq 0$, then $(k-m) \div m = (k \div m) - 1$.

Let $m$, $n$ be natural numbers, $X$, $D$ be non empty sets, $F$ be a function from $X$ into $(D^n)^m$, and $x$ be an element of $X$. Let us observe that the functor $F(x)$ yields an element of $(D^n)^m$. Let $m$ be a natural number, $X$, $Y$, $D$ be non empty sets, and $F$ be a function from $X \times Y$ into $D^m$. Let $y$ be an element of $Y$. Note that the functor $F(x,y)$ yields an element of $D^m$. Now we state the propositions:

(7) Let us consider natural numbers $m$, $n$, a non empty set $D$, and elements $F_1$, $F_2$ of $(D^n)^m$. Suppose natural numbers $i$, $j$. If $i \in \text{Seg } m$ and $j \in \text{Seg } n$, then $F_1(i)(j) = F_2(i)(j)$. Then $F_1 = F_2$.
(8) Let us consider a non empty set $D$ and elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4$ of $D$. Then $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 \rangle$ is an element of $D^4$.
(9) Let us consider a non empty set $D$ and elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ of $D$. Then $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5 \rangle$ is an element of $D^5$.
(10) Let us consider a non empty set $D$ and elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$ of $D$. Then $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8 \rangle$ is an element of $D^8$. The theorem is a consequence of (8).
(11) Let us consider a non empty set $D$ and elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, x_9, x_{10}$ of $D$. Then $\langle x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8, x_9, x_{10} \rangle$ is an element of $D^{10}$. The theorem is a consequence of (9).
(12) Let us consider a non empty set $D$ and elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6, x_7, x_8$ of $D^4$. Then $\langle x_1 \cap x_5, x_2 \cap x_6, x_3 \cap x_7, x_4 \cap x_8 \rangle$ is an element of $(D^8)^4$. The theorem is a consequence of (8).
(13) Let us consider a non empty set $D$, an element $x$ of $(D^4)^4$, and an element $k$ of $\mathbb{N}$. Suppose $k \in \text{Seg } 4$. Then there exist elements $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4$ of $D$ such that

(i) $x_1 = x(k)(1)$, and
(ii) $x_2 = x(k)(2)$, and
(iii) $x_3 = x(k)(3)$, and
(iv) $x_4 = x(k)(4)$.
Let us consider non-empty sets $X$, $Y$, a function $f$ from $X$ into $Y$, and a function $g$ from $Y$ into $X$. Suppose

(i) for every element $x$ of $X$, $g(f(x)) = x$, and

(ii) for every element $y$ of $Y$, $f(g(y)) = y$.

Then

(iii) $f$ is one-to-one, and

(iv) $f$ is onto, and

(v) $g$ is one-to-one, and

(vi) $g$ is onto, and

(vii) $g = f^{-1}$, and

(viii) $f = g^{-1}$.

2. State Array

The array of AES-State yielding a function from $Boolean^{128}$ into $((Boolean^8)^4)^4$ is defined by

(Def. 1) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $Boolean^{128}$ and natural numbers $i$, $j$. Suppose $i$, $j \in \text{Seg} \ 4$. Then $it(i_1)(i) = \text{mid}(i_1, (1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32, ((1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32) + 7)$.

Now we state the propositions:

(15) Let us consider a natural number $k$. Suppose $1 \leq k \leq 128$. Then there exist natural numbers $i$, $j$ such that

(i) $i$, $j \in \text{Seg} \ 4$, and

(ii) $(1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32 \leq k \leq (1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32 + 7$.

(16) Let us consider natural numbers $i$, $j$, $i_0$, $j_0$. Suppose

(i) $i$, $j$, $i_0$, $j_0 \in \text{Seg} \ 4$, and

(ii) it is not true that $i = i_0$ and $j = j_0$.

Then $\{k, \text{ where } k \text{ is a natural number : } (1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32 \leq k \leq (8 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32\} \cap \{k, \text{ where } k \text{ is a natural number : } (1 + (i_0 - '1) \cdot 8) + (j_0 - '1) \cdot 32 \leq k \leq (8 + (i_0 - '1) \cdot 8) + (j_0 - '1) \cdot 32\} = \emptyset$.

(17) Let us consider natural numbers $k$, $i$, $j$, $i_0$, $j_0$. Suppose

(i) $1 \leq k \leq 128$, and

(ii) $i$, $j$, $i_0$, $j_0 \in \text{Seg} \ 4$, and

(iii) $(1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32 \leq k \leq ((1 + (i - '1) \cdot 8) + (j - '1) \cdot 32) + 7$, and
(iv) \( (i_0 -'1) \cdot 8 + (j_0 -'1) \cdot 32 \leq k \leq ((1+(i_0 -'1) \cdot 8) + (j_0 -'1) \cdot 32) + 7 \).

Then

(v) \( i = i_0 \), and
(vi) \( j = j_0 \).

The theorem is a consequence of (16).

(18) The array of AES-State is one-to-one. The theorem is a consequence of (15).

**Proof:** For every elements \( x_1, x_2 \) such that \( x_1, x_2 \in \mathrm{Boolean}^{128} \) and (the array of AES-State)(\( x_1 \)) = (the array of AES-State)(\( x_2 \)) holds \( x_1 = x_2 \) by \[15 (3)], \[2 (11)], \[4 (1)]. \( \square \)

(19) The array of AES-State is onto. The theorem is a consequence of (15) and (17).

**Proof:** For every element \( y \) such that \( y \in ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) there exists an element \( x \) such that \( x \in \mathrm{Boolean}^{128} \) and \( y = (\mathrm{array of AES-State})(x) \) by \[4 (1)], \[7 (3)], \[15 (3)]. \( \square \)

Let us note that the array of AES-State is bijective.

Now we state the proposition:

(20) Let us consider an element \( c \) of \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \). Then (the array of AES-State)((the array of AES-State)\(^{-1}(c)) = c. \)

3. **SubBytes**

In this paper \( S \) denotes a permutation of \( \mathrm{Boolean}^8 \).

Let us consider \( S \). The functor \( \text{SubBytes}(S) \) yielding a function from \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) into \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) is defined by

**(Def. 2)** Let us consider an element \( i_1 \) of \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) and natural numbers \( i, j \). Suppose \( i, j \in \mathrm{Seg} 4 \). Then there exists an element \( i_2 \) of \( \mathrm{Boolean}^8 \) such that

(i) \( i_2 = i_1(i)(j) \), and
(ii) \( S(i_2) = S(i_1)(i)(j) \).

The functor \( \text{InvSubBytes}(S) \) yielding a function from \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) into \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) is defined by

**(Def. 3)** Let us consider an element \( i_1 \) of \( ((\mathrm{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) and natural numbers \( i, j \). Suppose \( i, j \in \mathrm{Seg} 4 \). Then there exists an element \( i_2 \) of \( \mathrm{Boolean}^8 \) such that

(i) \( i_2 = i_1(i)(j) \), and
(ii) \( S^{-1}(i_2) = S^{-1}(i_1)(i)(j) \).

Now we state the propositions:
(21) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$.
Then $(\text{InvSubBytes}(S))((\text{SubBytes}(S))(i_1)) = i_1$. The theorem is a consequence of (7).
(22) Let us consider an element $o$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$.
Then $(\text{SubBytes}(S))((\text{InvSubBytes}(S))(o)) = o$. The theorem is a consequence of (7).

(23) (i) $\text{SubBytes}(S)$ is one-to-one, and
(ii) $\text{SubBytes}(S)$ is onto, and
(iii) $\text{InvSubBytes}(S)$ is one-to-one, and
(iv) $\text{InvSubBytes}(S)$ is onto, and
(v) $\text{InvSubBytes}(S) = (\text{SubBytes}(S))^{-1}$, and
(vi) $\text{SubBytes}(S) = (\text{InvSubBytes}(S))^{-1}$.
The theorem is a consequence of (21), (22), and (14).

4. ShiftRows

The functor $\text{ShiftRows}$ yielding a function
from $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ into $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ is defined by
(Def. 4) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ and a natural number
$i$. Suppose $i \in \text{Seg } 4$. Then there exists an element $x_i$ of $\text{Boolean}^8$ such that
(i) $x_i = i_1(i)$, and
(ii) $it(i_1)(i) = \text{Op-Shift}(x_i, 5 - i)$.

The functor $\text{InvShiftRows}$ yielding a function from $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ into
$((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ is defined by
(Def. 5) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ and a natural number
$i$. Suppose $i \in \text{Seg } 4$. Then there exists an element $x_i$ of $\text{Boolean}^8$ such that
(i) $x_i = i_1(i)$, and
(ii) $it(i_1)(i) = \text{Op-Shift}(x_i, i - 1)$.

Now we state the propositions:
(24) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$.
Then $\text{InvShiftRows}(\text{ShiftRows}(i_1)) = i_1$.
(25) Let us consider an element $o$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$.
Then $\text{ShiftRows}(\text{InvShiftRows}(o)) = o$.
(26) (i) $\text{ShiftRows}$ is one-to-one, and
(ii) $\text{ShiftRows}$ is onto, and
(iii) \( \text{InvShiftRows} \) is one-to-one, and
(iv) \( \text{InvShiftRows} \) is onto, and
(v) \( \text{InvShiftRows} = \text{ShiftRows}^{-1} \), and
(vi) \( \text{ShiftRows} = \text{InvShiftRows}^{-1} \).

5. AddRoundKey

The functor \( \text{AddRoundKey} \) yielding a function from \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \times ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) into \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) is defined by

(Def. 6) Let us consider elements \( t_1, k_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \) and natural numbers \( i, j \). Suppose \( i, j \in \text{Seg} \ 4 \). Then there exist elements \( t_2, k_2 \) of \( \text{Boolean}^8 \) such that

(i) \( t_2 = t_1(i)(j) \), and
(ii) \( k_2 = k_1(i)(j) \), and
(iii) \( it(t_1, k_1)(i)(j) = \text{Op-XOR}(t_2, k_2) \).

6. Key Expansion

Let us consider \( S \). Let \( x \) be an element of \( (\text{Boolean}^8)^4 \).

The functor \( \text{SubWord}(S, x) \) yielding an element of \( (\text{Boolean}^8)^4 \) is defined by

(Def. 7) Let us consider an element \( i \) of \( \text{Seg} \ 4 \). Then \( it(i) = S(x(i)) \).

The functor \( \text{RotWord}(x) \) yielding an element of \( (\text{Boolean}^8)^4 \) is defined by the term

(Def. 8) \( \text{Op-LeftShift}(x) \).

Let \( n, m \) be non zero elements of \( \mathbb{N} \) and \( s, t \) be elements of \( (\text{Boolean}^n)^m \).

The functor \( \text{XOR-Word}(s, t) \) yielding an element of \( (\text{Boolean}^n)^m \) is defined by

(Def. 9) Let us consider an element \( i \) of \( \text{Seg} \ m \). Then \( it(i) = \text{Op-XOR}(s(i), t(i)) \).

The functor \( \text{Rcon} \) yielding an element of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^{10} \) is defined by

(Def. 10) \( \begin{align*}
(i) \quad & \text{it}(1) = \langle (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 0, 0), \rangle, \\
(ii) \quad & \text{it}(2) = \langle (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 0, 0), \rangle, \\
(iii) \quad & \text{it}(3) = \langle (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 0, 0), \rangle, \\
(iv) \quad & \text{it}(4) = \langle (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0) \sim (0, 0, 0, 0), \rangle,
\end{align*} \) and
(v) $it(5) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$, and

(vi) $it(6) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$, and

(vii) $it(7) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$, and

(viii) $it(8) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$, and

(ix) $it(9) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$, and

(x) $it(10) = \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle \cdot \langle 0, 0, 0, 0 \rangle$.

Let us consider $S$. Let $m$, $i$, and $w$ be natural numbers and $w$ be an element of $(\text{Boolean}^8)^4$. Assume $m = 4$ or $m = 6$ or $m = 8$ and $i < 4 \cdot (7 + m)$ and $m \leq i$. The functor $\text{KeyExpansion}_T(S, m, i, w)$ yielding an element of $(\text{Boolean}^8)^4$ is defined by

(Def. 11) (i) there exists an element $T_3$ of $(\text{Boolean}^8)^4$ such that $T_3 = \text{Recon}(\frac{i}{2})$ and $it = \text{XOR-Word(SubWord}(S, (\text{RotWord}(w))))$, if $i \mod m = 0$,

(ii) $it = \text{SubWord}(S, w)$, if $m = 8$ and $i \mod 8 = 4$,

(iii) $it = w$, otherwise.

Let $m$ be a natural number. Assume $m = 4$ or $m = 6$ or $m = 8$. The functor $\text{KeyExpansion}_W(S, m)$ yielding a function from $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m$ into $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^{4 \cdot (7 + m)}$ is defined by

(Def. 12) Let us consider an element $K$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m$. Then

(i) for every element $i$ of $\mathbb{N}$ such that $i < m$ holds $it(K)(i+1) = K(i+1)$, and

(ii) for every element $i$ of $\mathbb{N}$ such that $m \leq i < 4 \cdot (7 + m)$ there exists an element $P$ of $(\text{Boolean}^8)^4$ and there exists an element $Q$ of $(\text{Boolean}^8)^4$ such that $P = it(K)((i - m) + 1)$ and $Q = it(K)(i)$ and $it(K)(i + 1) = \text{XOR-Word}(P, \text{KeyExpansion}_T(S, m, i, Q))$.

The functor $\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m)$ yielding a function from $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m$ into $(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4)^{7 + m}$ is defined by

(Def. 13) Let us consider an element $K$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m$. Then there exists an element $w$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^{4 \cdot (7 + m)}$ such that

(i) $w = (\text{KeyExpansion}_W(S, m))(K)$, and

(ii) for every natural number $i$ such that $i < 7 + m$ holds $it(K)(i+1) = \langle w(4 \cdot i + 1), w(4 \cdot i + 2), w(4 \cdot i + 3), w(4 \cdot i + 4) \rangle$. 
7. Encryption and Decryption

In the sequel $\mathcal{M}_1$ denotes a permutation of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ and $\mathcal{M}_2$ denotes a permutation of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$.

Let us consider $S$ and $\mathcal{M}_1$. Let $m$ be a natural number, $t_1$ be an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$, and $K$ be an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m$. The functor $\text{AES-Cipher}(S, \mathcal{M}_1, t_1, K)$ yielding an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ is defined by

(Def. 14) There exists a finite sequence $s_1$ of elements of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

(i) $\text{len } s_1 = (7 + m) - 1$, and

(ii) there exists an element $K_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_1 = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(1) \text{ and } s_1(1) = \text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, K_1), \]

and

(iii) for every natural number $i$ such that $1 \leq i < (7 + m) - 1$ there exists an element $K_i$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_i = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(i + 1) \text{ and } \]

\[ s_1(i + 1) = \text{AddRoundKey}((\mathcal{M}_1\cdot\text{ShiftRows})\cdot\text{SubBytes}(S))(s_1(i)), K_i), \]

and

(iv) there exists an element $K_n$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_n = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(7 + m) \text{ and } \]

\[ \text{it} = \text{AddRoundKey}((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(s_1((7 + m) - 1)), K_n). \]

The functor $\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, \mathcal{M}_1, t_1, K)$ yielding an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ is defined by

(Def. 15) There exists a finite sequence $s_1$ of elements of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

(i) $\text{len } s_1 = (7 + m) - 1$, and

(ii) there exists an element $K_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_1 = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(1) \text{ and } s_1(1) = \]

\[ (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})(\text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, K_1)), \]

and

(iii) for every natural number $i$ such that $1 \leq i < (7 + m) - 1$ there exists an element $K_i$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_i = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(i + 1) \text{ and } s_1(i + 1) = \]

\[ ((\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows}) \cdot \mathcal{M}_1^{-1})(\text{AddRoundKey}(s_1(i), K_i)), \]

and

(iv) there exists an element $K_n$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ such that

\[ K_n = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(7 + m) \text{ and } \]

\[ \text{it} = \text{AddRoundKey}(s_1((7 + m) - 1), K_n). \]

Now we state the propositions:

(27) Let us consider an element $i_1$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$. Then $\mathcal{M}_1^{-1}(\mathcal{M}_1(i_1)) = i_1$.

(28) Let us consider an element $o$ of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$. Then $\mathcal{M}_1(\mathcal{M}_1^{-1}(o)) = o$. 
Let us consider a natural number \( m \) and an element \( t_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \).

Now we state the propositions:

(29) \( (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(t_1)) = t_1 \).

(30) \( ((\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows}) \cdot M_1^{-1})(((M_1 \cdot \text{ShiftRows}) \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(t_1)) = t_1 \).

Now we state the propositions:

(31) Let us consider a natural number \( m \), an element \( t_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \), an element \( K \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m \), and elements \( d_k, e_k \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \).

Suppose

(i) \( m = 4 \) or \( m = 6 \) or \( m = 8 \), and

(ii) \( d_k = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K))(1), and

(iii) \( e_k = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(7 + m) \).

Then \( \text{AddRoundKey}(\text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, e_k), d_k) = t_1 \). The theorem is a consequence of (7).

(32) Let us consider a natural number \( m \), an element \( t_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \), an element \( k_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m \), and elements \( d_k, e_k \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \).

Suppose

(i) \( m = 4 \) or \( m = 6 \) or \( m = 8 \), and

(ii) \( d_k = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(k_1)(1), and

(iii) \( e_k = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(k_1))(7 + m) \).

Then \( \text{AddRoundKey}(\text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, e_k), d_k) = t_1 \). The theorem is a consequence of (7).

(33) Let us consider a natural number \( m \), elements \( t_1, o_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \), an element \( K \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m \), and elements \( K_1, K_n \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \).

Suppose

(i) \( m = 4 \) or \( m = 6 \) or \( m = 8 \), and

(ii) \( K_1 = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(1), and

(iii) \( K_n = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(7 + m) \), and

(iv) \( o_1 = \text{AddRoundKey}((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(t_1), K_n) \).

Then \( (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})(\text{AddRoundKey}(o_1, K_1)) = t_1 \). The theorem is a consequence of (32) and (29).

(34) Let us consider natural numbers \( m, i \), an element \( t_1 \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \), an element \( K \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m \), and elements \( e_i, d_i \) of \( ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4 \).

Suppose

(i) \( m = 4 \) or \( m = 6 \) or \( m = 8 \), and

(ii) \( i \leq (7 + m) - 1 \), and

(iii) \( e_i = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)((7 + m) - i) \), and

\( o_1 = \text{AddRoundKey}((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(t_1), K_n) \).

Then \( (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})(\text{AddRoundKey}(o_1, K_1)) = t_1 \). The theorem is a consequence of (32) and (29).
(iv) \(d_i = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(i + 1)\).

Then \(\text{AddRoundKey}(\text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, e_i), d_i) = t_1\). The theorem is a consequence of (7).

(35) Let us consider a natural number \(m\), an element \(t_1\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\), and an element \(K\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^m\). Suppose

(i) \(m = 4\), or
(ii) \(m = 6\), or
(iii) \(m = 8\).

Then \(\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, M_1, (\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K)), K) = t_1\). The theorem is a consequence of (34) and (30).

Proof: Reconsider \(N = (7 + m) - 1\) as a natural number. Consider \(e_s\) being a finite sequence of elements of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(e_s = N\) and there exists an element \(K_1\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(K_1 = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(1)\) and \(e_s(1) = \text{AddRoundKey}(((M_1 \cdot \text{ShiftRows}) \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(e_s(i)), K_1)\) and there exists an element \(K_n\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(K_n = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(7 + m)\) and \(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K) = \text{AddRoundKey}(((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(e_s(N)), K_n)\). Consider \(d_s\) being a finite sequence of elements of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(d_s = N\) and there exists an element \(K_1\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(K_1 = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(1)\) and \(d_s(1) = (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})(\text{AddRoundKey}(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K), K_1))\) and for every natural number \(i\) such that \(1 \leq i < N\) there exists an element \(K_i\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(K_i = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(i + 1)\) and \(d_s(i + 1) = (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows} \cdot M_1^{-1})(\text{AddRoundKey}(d_s(i), K_i))\) and there exists an element \(K_n\) of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(K_n = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(7 + m)\) and \(\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, M_1, (\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K)), K) = \text{AddRoundKey}(d_s(N), K_n)\). Consider \(e_1\) being an element of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(e_1 = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(1)\) and \(e_s(1) = \text{AddRoundKey}(t_1, e_1)\). Consider \(e_n\) being an element of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(e_n = (\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)(7 + m)\) and \(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K) = \text{AddRoundKey}(((\text{ShiftRows} \cdot \text{SubBytes}(S))(e_s(N)), e_n)\). Consider \(d_1\) being an element of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(d_1 = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(1)\) and \(d_s(1) = (\text{InvSubBytes}(S) \cdot \text{InvShiftRows})(\text{AddRoundKey}(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K), d_1))\). Consider \(d_n\) being an element of \(((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4\) such that \(d_n = (\text{Rev}((\text{KeyExpansion}(S, m))(K)))(7 + m)\) and \(\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, M_1, (\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_1, t_1, K)), K) = \text{AddRoundKey}(d_s(N), d_n)\). Define \(\mathcal{R}[	ext{natural number}] \equiv \) if \(s_1 < N\), then \(d_s(s_1 + 1) = e_s(N - s_1)\). For every natural number \(i\) such that \(\mathcal{R}[i]\)

(36) Let us consider a non empty set $D$, non zero elements $n, m$ of $\mathbb{N}$, and an element $r$ of $D^n$. Suppose

(i) $m \leq n$, and

(ii) $8 \leq n - m$.

Then $\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,m),8)$ is an element of $D^8$.

Let $r$ be an element of $\text{Boolean}^{128}$. The functor $\text{AES-InitState128Key}(r)$ yielding an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4$ is defined by

(Def. 16) (i) $it(1) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(r,8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,8),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,16),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,24),8) \rangle$, and

(ii) $it(2) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,32),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,40),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,48),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,56),8) \rangle$, and

(iii) $it(3) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,64),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,72),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,80),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,88),8) \rangle$, and

(iv) $it(4) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,96),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,104),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,112),8), \text{Op-Right}(r,120) \rangle$.

Let $r$ be an element of $\text{Boolean}^{192}$. The functor $\text{AES-InitState192Key}(r)$ yielding an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^6$ is defined by

(Def. 17) (i) $it(1) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(r,8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,8),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,16),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,24),8) \rangle$, and

(ii) $it(2) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,32),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,40),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,48),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,56),8) \rangle$, and

(iii) $it(3) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,64),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,72),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,80),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,88),8) \rangle$, and

(iv) $it(4) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,96),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,104),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,112),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,120),8) \rangle$,

(v) $it(5) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,128),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,136),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,144),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,152),8) \rangle$, and

(vi) $it(6) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,160),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,168),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,176),8), \text{Op-Right}(r,184) \rangle$.

Let $r$ be an element of $\text{Boolean}^{256}$. The functor $\text{AES-InitState256Key}(r)$ yielding an element of $((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^8$ is defined by

(Def. 18) (i) $it(1) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(r,8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,8),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,16),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,24),8) \rangle$, and

(ii) $it(2) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,32),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,40),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,48),8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r,56),8) \rangle$, and
(iii) \( \hat{u}(3) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 64), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 72), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 80), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 88), 8) \rangle \), and

(iv) \( \hat{u}(4) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 96), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 104), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 112), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 120), 8) \rangle \), and

(v) \( \hat{u}(5) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 128), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 136), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 144), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 152), 8) \rangle \), and

(vi) \( \hat{u}(6) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 160), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 168), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 176), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 184), 8) \rangle \), and

(vii) \( \hat{u}(7) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 192), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 200), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 208), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 216), 8) \rangle \), and

(viii) \( \hat{u}(8) = \langle \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 224), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 232), 8), \\text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 240), 8), \text{Op-Left}(\text{Op-Right}(r, 248)) \rangle \).

Let us consider \( S \) and \( M_2 \). Let \( m_1 \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) and \( K \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \). The functor \( \text{AES-128enc}(S, M_2, m_1, K) \) yielding an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) is defined by the term

\[ \text{(Def. 19)} \quad \text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(m_1)), (\text{AES-InitState128Key}(K)))) \]

Let \( c \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \). The functor \( \text{AES-128dec}(S, M_2, c, K) \) yielding an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) is defined by the term

\[ \text{(Def. 20)} \quad \text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(c)), (\text{AES-InitState128Key}(K)))) \]

Now we state the proposition:

\[ \text{(37)} \quad \text{Let us consider a permutation } S \text{ of } \text{Boolean}^8, \text{ a permutation } M_2 \text{ of } ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4, \text{ and elements } m_1, K \text{ of } \text{Boolean}^{128}. \]

Then \( \text{AES-128dec}(S, M_2, (\text{AES-128enc}(S, M_2, m_1, K)), K) = m_1. \) The theorem is a consequence of (20) and (35).

Let us consider \( S \) and \( M_2 \). Let \( m_1 \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) and \( K \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{192} \). The functor \( \text{AES-192enc}(S, M_2, m_1, K) \) yielding an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) is defined by the term

\[ \text{(Def. 21)} \quad \text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(\text{AES-Cipher}(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(m_1)), (\text{AES-InitState192Key}(K)))) \]

Let \( c \) be an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \). The functor \( \text{AES-192dec}(S, M_2, c, K) \) yielding an element of \( \text{Boolean}^{128} \) is defined by the term

\[ \text{(Def. 22)} \quad \text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(\text{AES-InvCipher}(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(c)), (\text{AES-InitState192Key}(K)))) \]

Now we state the proposition:

\[ \text{(38)} \quad \text{Let us consider a permutation } S \text{ of } \text{Boolean}^8, \text{ a permutation } M_2 \text{ of } ((\text{Boolean}^8)^4)^4, \text{ an element } m_1 \text{ of } \text{Boolean}^{128}, \text{ and an element } K \text{ of } \text{Boolean}^{192}. \]
Then AES-192dec($S, M_2, (AES-192enc(S, M_2, m_1, K)), K) = m_1$. The theorem is a consequence of (20) and (35).

Let us consider $S$ and $M_2$. Let $m_1$ be an element of Boolean$_{128}$ and $K$ be an element of Boolean$_{256}$. The functor $AES-256enc(S, M_2, m_1, K)$ yielding an element of Boolean$_{128}$ is defined by the term

(Def. 23) $\text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(AES-Cipher(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(m_1)), (AES-InitState256Key(K))))$.

Let $c$ be an element of Boolean$_{128}$. The functor $AES-256dec(S, M_2, c, K)$ yielding an element of Boolean$_{128}$ is defined by the term

(Def. 24) $\text{(The array of AES-State)}^{-1}(AES-InvCipher(S, M_2, ((\text{the array of AES-State})(c)), (AES-InitState256Key(K))))$.

Now we state the proposition:

(39) Let us consider a permutation $S$ of Boolean$_8$, a permutation $M_2$ of ((Boolean$_8^4$)$_4^4$, an element $m_1$ of Boolean$_{128}$, and an element $K$ of Boolean$_{256}$.

Then AES-256dec($S, M_2, (AES-256enc(S, M_2, m_1, K)), K) = m_1$. The theorem is a consequence of (20) and (35).

REFERENCES


*Received October 7, 2013*